



Wii - Anaka Road – Nwoya District

Independent Review Report

19 June 2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	iii
LIST OF TABLES	iii
ABBREVIATIONS and ACRONYMS	iv
1.0 Executive Summary	1
2.0 Introduction	6
3.0 The Independent Review process and methodology.....	6
3.1 Projects selected for the Independent Review.....	7
4.0 Initial review of findings	10
4.1 Sources of data.....	10
4.2 Proactive disclosure.....	11
4.3 Proactive disclosure under the project and contract stages.....	12
4.4 Summary of factors affecting project implementation	12
4.5 Sources of funding.....	13
5.0 Selection of projects for in-depth review.....	15
5.1 Reactive disclosure.....	16
5.2 Reactive disclosure per project phase	17
5.3. Summary of tender management	18
5.4 Summary of quality management, environmental & social protection and health & safety.....	19
5.5 Summary of cost, time overruns, and stakeholder engagements	20
6.0 Summary of site visits	22
7.0 Recommendations for the Independent Review.....	23
8.0 References	26
<i>Annex 1: Overview of infrastructure programmes</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Annex 2: Summary of infrastructure projects</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Annex 3: IDS for proactive disclosure</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Annex 4: Overall proactive disclosure under project and contract stages</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Annex 5: IDS for in-depth review.....</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Annex 6: Disclosure per category (in-depth review)</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Annex 7: Assessment of processes</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Annex 8: Site visit findings</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Annex 9: Community baraza meetings.....</i>	<i>27</i>

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: The Independent Review Process	7
Figure 2: Location of programmes	9
Figure 4: Factors Affecting Project Implementation	13
Figure 5: Source of Funding	14
Figure 6: Overall level of Reactive Disclosure	16
Figure 7: Number of firms participating in the tendering process	18
Figure 8: Time overruns for selected road projects under MoLG	21

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Sources of Data	10
Table 3: Selected Infrastructure Projects and Districts	16
Table 4: Assessment of Processes	19

ABBREVIATIONS and ACRONYMS

AfDB	African Development Bank
AFIC	Africa Freedom of Information Centre
ASAP	Adaptation for Smallholder Agricultural Programme
CARs	Community Access Roads
CoST	Construction Sector Transparency
eGP	Electronic Government Procurement
GPP	Government Procurement Portal
IDS	Infrastructure Data Standard
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
LEGS	Local Economic Growth Support
LLF	Lives and Livelihood Fund
MATIP-2	Markets and Agricultural Trade Improvement II
MLHUD	Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
NDP III	National Development Plan III
NITA-U	National Information Technology Authority - Uganda
OC4IDS	Open Contracting for Infrastructure Data Standard
PE	Procuring Entity
PPDA Act	Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority Act
PPPs	Public Private Partnerships
PWDs	Persons With Disability
PRELNOR	Project for Restoration of Livelihoods in Northern Uganda
RUDSEC	Rural Development and Food Security in Northern Uganda
UIPE	Uganda Institute of Professional Engineers
USMID	Uganda Support to Municipal Infrastructure Development

Forward from the Champion

I am pleased to present to you stakeholders in the infrastructure sector, the 6th Independent Review Report (formerly Assurance report) conducted by CoST Uganda for Road Infrastructure Projects under the Ministry of Local Government. This Independent Review process took a sector approach following the 5th Assurance process, which was carried out in 2022.

In this Independent Review Report, we are disseminating and validating today, four programmes were assessed under the Ministry of Local Government, and they include Project for the Restoration of Livelihood in Northern Uganda (PRELNOR), RUDSEC, Market Agriculture, Trade Improvement Project (MATIP II), and Local Economics Growth Support (LEGS). Since the focus was on road infrastructure, deeper analyses were done for two programmes, including PRELNOR and LEGS, covering a total of 62 infrastructure road projects. Ten (10) projects were selected for reactive studies to validate information obtained during the desk review process, and the reactive studies were conducted in five districts of Nwoya, Kitgum, for the PRELNOR project, while in Ntoroko, Kabarole, and Gomba for the LEGS projects.

I congratulate the Ministry of Local Government and CoST Uganda for the successful completion of this exercise in such a critical time government is putting more resources on the sector and this kind of assessment helps government to mirror itself on the level of transparency and accountability in the delivery of quality infrastructure that stands the taste of time and contribute to effective, and efficient public investments for the sector development.

The Ministry of Works and Transport have continued to Champion the CoST Uganda Programme since February 2017 to date and has since superintended the publication of five Assurance reports spanning fifty-nine (59) projects from ten (10) high spend entities and two (2) Infrastructure Transparency Index (ITI) covering one hundred eighteen (118) projects spanning sixty (60) entities across the country. I am delighted that the Initiative has contributed to evidence-based reforms and trust-building on public infrastructure investments in Uganda over the years, and we encourage them to continue with their interest in assessing more projects. This independent review will help refocus strategies for delivering better infrastructure projects and depend on the use of the CoST tools and standards.

In this report, proactive disclosure for the Ministry of Local Government stands at 58%, which is an improvement of 08% from the 5th Assurance report that registered 50%, while reactive disclosure stands at 60% registering a decline of 17% from 77% registered in the 5th Assurance report. The disclosure trends for the Ministry of Local Government since the CoST scoping study have improved by 26% from 33% in 2017 to 59% in 2025; although this result is good, there is hope for better performance in the future if the Ministry addresses the key issues raised in this report. The report noted that PRELNOR and LEGS registered delays of up to 13% and 135% of the original contract duration, respectively, citing procurement delays and financial challenges, while MATIP-II and RUDSEC registered no delays/impact on the original duration of the contracts.

I commend the Ministry for the improvements in proactive disclosure, and I encourage the Ministry and stakeholders to strengthen reactive disclosure. In 2021, the Government committed to increasing the disclosure of infrastructure project data. The CoST tools and standard, for instance, the OC4IDS, were aligned to the Government Procurement Portal (GPP), and efforts are being made to align it to the Electronic Government Procurement Portal (e-GP), and that is still work in Progress. Promoting transparency and accountability is critical because it allows citizens' participation and ownership of public investments.

The Government, through my Ministry, reassures CoST International and stakeholders that we shall continue to fulfil our commitments of implementing the CoST features in Uganda.

For God and My Country.



**GENERAL EDWARD KATUMBA WAMALA,
Minister of Works and Transport, CoST Uganda Champion**

Message from the CoST Manager-Uganda

The CoST National Secretariat is highly indebted to stakeholders for their enthusiasm in accepting and supporting our work, especially in implementing the CoST features in Uganda. Since 2017, CoST Uganda has published 6 issue-based studies, five Assurance reports, and two Infrastructure Transparency Index and this is the 6th Independent Review report being disseminated, validated, and launched.

This Independent Review process (former Assurance Process) was conducted under the Ministry of Local Government, and we sincerely congratulate the Ministry of Local Government for allowing us to conduct this study. The study took a sector approach following the 5th Assurance process that was conducted under the Ministry of Health in 2022, and we believe through this approach, we shall be able to provide specific issues and recommendations to address concerns on transparency and accountability in the delivery of public infrastructure projects that can transform the lives of the citizenry.

In a special way, we congratulate the Ag. Commissioner-Procurement Inspection and Coordination Department (PICD and Procurement specialist. The Chief Administrative Officers, Engineers, and Procurement Officers from the districts of Nwoya, Kitgum, Ntoroko, Kabarole, and Gomba for walking with us throughout the assessment period to its completion in 2025. The results from the independent review process reveal positive strides in proactive disclosure, although it registered a decline in reactive disclosure from 77% in the 2017 scoping study to 60% in 2025. Generally, the Ministry's overall disclosure increased by 26% based on 33% in 2017 and 59% in 2025. There is hope for better improvement if the concerns raised in this report are addressed by the Ministry.

Much appreciation goes to the consultant (Mr. Derrick Muzoora), the Executive Director-Africa Freedom of Information Centre, and the CoST International Secretariat staff for providing technical assistance to make this a success.

We extend our heartfelt appreciation to the Ministry of Works and Transport for always providing stewardship for the successful programme implementation and uptake of the recommendations. Finally, recognize the invaluable contribution from the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office for providing the financial assistance to implement the CoST features in Uganda; without such financial assistance, this would not have been possible.

We call upon the stakeholders to consider and implement the recommendations advanced in this report to achieve full transparency and accountability in the infrastructure sector in Uganda.

“For Quality Infrastructure, Stronger Economies and Better Lives”

Many thanks



Geoffrey Odong
CoST Manager-Uganda

1.0 Executive Summary

This report presents the findings and recommendations from an Independent Review conducted on infrastructure projects under the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG). The study involved two key stages. The desk study focused on reviewing available information on formal public disclosure platforms to assess proactive disclosure, while the reactive analysis involved field visits to selected projects to verify disclosed data. The study assessed infrastructure sector performance by reviewing four key programmes, which include the Market Agricultural Trade Improvement Project II (MATIP-II), the Project for Restoration of Livelihoods in Northern Uganda (PRELNOR), the Rural Development and Food Security Project (RUDSEC), and the Local Economic Growth Support Project (LEGS)

The purpose of the Independent Review report is to provide an evidence-based assessment of the performance, transparency, and governance of infrastructure projects under MoLG, with a particular focus on identifying the sectoral weaknesses that undermine value for money and the long-term sustainability of public investments. The report highlights critical issues such as weak disclosure and transparency systems, heavy reliance on external funding, Insufficient institutional and technical capacity, and delayed project implementation. Notably, the report highlights a persistent failure to adequately plan and allocate budgets for infrastructure maintenance and asset management, a shortcoming that undermines the longevity of completed projects and erodes their anticipated socio-economic benefits.

By exposing these challenges, the report aims to make actionable recommendations for improving institutional frameworks, capacity, and disclosure practices in the local government infrastructure sector, in alignment with relevant national regulations.

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS

Institutional Framework Concerns

1. Weak disclosure and transparency systems.

- Overall proactive disclosure for infrastructure projects assessed under MoLG stood at 58%, with MATIP-II performing best at 88%, PRELNOR 68%, RUDSEC 40% and LEGS lowest at 35%. (Refer to IDS)
- The MoLG website was under maintenance during the three months of the proactive disclosure review, restricting access to vital contract and project data, which undermines the government's efforts to encourage the use of ICT to promote transparency, accountability, and improved engagement with citizens.
- For the PRELNOR programme, the review identified that the departure of the externally recruited project team at closure, coupled with the project's Gulu-based office's lack of contact traceability, left critical documents inaccessible and unavailable.

Recommendation

- MoLG is encouraged to improve its internal information management systems and utilize the government's digital disclosure platforms such as the eGP and GPP to archive and disclose data on infrastructure projects to enhance transparency and accountability.

- MoLG should establish a dedicated contingency framework to ensure uninterrupted access to essential contract and project data during periods of website maintenance or systems downtime through hosting critical documents on a mirrored platform and integrating a temporary public access portal.
- To institutionalize knowledge transfer and handover protocols, MoLG can set up a central MoLG repository that is both physical and digital for archiving project reports and operational documents. Additionally, MoLG can establish end-of-project workshops where technical staff are briefed on project outcomes, challenges, and recommendations.

2. Persistent cost overruns

- The data revealed a recurring challenge of cost overruns in local government infrastructure projects, particularly under the LEGS programme. A notable example is the Kyai-Kyabagamba road in Gomba district, which registered cost overruns of 86% beyond the original contract sum, attributed to inadequate contract design reviews and flawed BoQ preparation.

Recommendation

- MoLG should strengthen its contract management framework by institutionalizing mandatory, multi-level technical reviews of contract designs and Bills of Quantities (BoQ) prior to tendering. All infrastructure designs should be made comprehensive, incorporating detailed site assessments, technical specifications, and accurate quantity take-offs to minimize scope ambiguities and unforeseen variations during implementation.

3. Weak asset management and maintenance culture.

- While Uganda has established asset management policies, such as the Government of Uganda Asset Accounting Policies and Guidelines (AAPG)¹ and the Public Financial Management Act 2015, findings from the LEGS and PRELNOR projects revealed gaps in local-level implementation. Some of these included outdated asset registers and insufficient funding for maintenance activities, leading to reduced service life.
- Additionally, there was no data that suggested the presence of operations and maintenance manuals, maintenance budgets, or asset transfer protocols, which could potentially weaken infrastructure sustainability and risk premature deterioration.

Recommendation

- MoLG should consider establishing or strengthening asset management units responsible for inventory, maintenance scheduling, and asset condition monitoring to ensure efficient and effective management throughout their lifecycle.
- MoLG is encouraged to require all Local Governments implementing infrastructure projects to include life-cycle costing, operation, and maintenance plans as part of feasibility studies to shift focus from short-term to long-term value for money.

Capacity Issues

4. Insufficient institutional and technical capacity

¹ MoFPED GoU Asset Accounting Policies and Guidelines. April 2023

- Accessed data revealed persistent weaknesses in post-construction handover processes, with local governments lacking the necessary technical, financial, and logistical capacity to effectively assume responsibility for supervising, maintaining, and managing infrastructure assets, thereby compromising their ability to serve their intended lifespan.
- The review established that MoLG faces insufficient institutional capacity to effectively manage infrastructure projects after construction is complete, characterized by inadequate asset management systems and limited technical supervision capabilities, which collectively undermine the sustainability and functionality of completed investments.
- The review revealed that MoLG lacks adequate technical capacity to manage infrastructure projects post-construction, evidenced by limited personnel for asset supervision, absence of dedicated infrastructure maintenance units, and weak systems for routine inspection and performance monitoring, which hinders the preservation and optimal functionality of completed assets.
- Limited and delayed involvement of local communities contributed to project scope changes and community dissatisfaction. For example, in Nwoya, the 5.2km Go Dero Wii Lacor was diverted and extended to 7.9km after the project failed to secure the right of way through private land, as compensation provisions were not in place, and the extension suffocated the Environmental Safety and Health and safety safeguards. Similarly, in Gomba, community members expressed concerns about the project's relevance and benefits due to inadequate information on project timelines, budgets, and objectives.

Recommendation

- MoLG should establish a dedicated Infrastructure Asset Management Unit responsible for overseeing post-construction supervision, maintenance planning, and asset performance tracking.
- MoLG, in partnership with professional sector bodies and entities, is encouraged to launch national capacity-building programmes for LG engineers on construction contract administration, environmental and social safeguards, quality management systems, and infrastructure asset management. Additionally, MoLG-MoWT technical workshops could be held to facilitate peer learning.
- To foster effective citizen engagement in infrastructure projects, MoLG is encouraged to implement a multi-faceted approach that involves early and continuous communication, transparency, and collaborative decision-making with citizens. This includes ensuring timely and accessible information, providing diverse avenues for engagement, and actively seeking feedback throughout the project lifecycle.

5. Weak contractual enforcement mechanisms.

- Accessed data revealed that contract agreements under PRELNOR and LEGS lacked comprehensive and detailed binding provisions on quality assurance, environmental & social safeguards, and health and safety management conforming to UNBS codes, ISO 9001:2015, and other national standards.

Recommendation

- MoLG should urgently revise its standard contract templates for infrastructure projects to include comprehensive and binding provisions for Quality Assurance, Environmental

& Social Safeguards, and Health & Safety management to clearly define contractor obligations, reporting requirements, and compliance measures.

6. Delayed programme implementation

- PRELNOR and LEGS registered delays of up to 13% and 135%² of the original duration, respectively, citing procurement delays and financial challenges, while MATIP-II and RUDSEC registered no delays/impact to the original duration.
- MATIP-2 cited delays associated with the procurement of consultants and contractors to undertake the work of rebuilding 12 markets³

Recommendation

- Through partnerships with entities like PPDA and MoFPED, MoLG is encouraged to strengthen its procurement planning capacity through regular procurement training of staff, resource allocation, and enhancing collaboration between departments to remove bottlenecks.

² Performance of externally funded projects – MoFPED Pg. 273 & Pg. 280

³ Project Completion rReport for Public Sector Operations 04.10.2024 – AfDB Pg. 4

About CoST Uganda – the infrastructure transparency initiative

CoST – the infrastructure transparency initiative is a global initiative whose international secretariat is based in London, United Kingdom (UK). Locally managed member programmes apply CoST standards and tools to support transparency and accountability efforts by public entities in public infrastructure projects.

CoST Programmes generally operate through a partnership between the government, the private sector, and civil society. This partnership promotes the disclosure and validation of infrastructure project data, turning data into information, helping stakeholders to engage and influence infrastructure delivery performance and reduce investment losses.

In Uganda, the CoST programme is hosted by the Africa Freedom of Information Centre (AFIC), which provides management and administrative support to the programme. The programme is championed by the Ministry of Works and Transport (MoWT), which provides high-level political and institutional support to CoST Uganda. The champion mobilizes government commitment, facilitates policy reforms, and ensures effective stakeholder engagement to enhance accountability, improve disclosure, and promote good governance in public infrastructure delivery.

While the CoST model globally operates through a structured partnership known as the multi-stakeholder group (MSG), CoST Uganda's MSG has not yet been formally re-established. In the interim, the programme, along with the lead institutions, has established a multistakeholder approach that includes all three stakeholders (government, private sector and civil society) in its interventions and events.

Our Approach: CoST Pillars

The CoST approach to improving infrastructure transparency and accountability is built on four pillars: **publication of data (Disclosure), independent review of data (Assurance), multi-stakeholder working, and social accountability.**

Publication of data. This involves the timely and open disclosure of comprehensive information about infrastructure projects (purpose, scope, costs, execution) by procuring entities, adhering to standards such as the Cost Infrastructure Data Standard (IDS) and the Open Contracting for Infrastructure Data Standard (OC4IDS), which specify numerous data points that must be disclosed at various project stages.

The independent review process analyzes disclosed data by entities, and the results are used to promote accountability by the CoST Uganda National Secretariat. They identify key concerns and simplify technical information, enabling social accountability stakeholders to understand issues and hold decision-makers responsible.

Multi-stakeholder working brings together government, the private sector, and civil society in national programs. This collaboration guides the CoST programme implementation by providing a neutral platform for pursuing transparency and accountability together and fosters a consensus on critical infrastructure issues.

Social accountability recognizes the crucial role of the media and civil society in holding decision-makers accountable. CoST works with these stakeholders to disseminate the independent review's findings, raising public awareness and enabling citizens to demand accountability.

2.0 Introduction

CoST Uganda extends its sincere appreciation to the Ministry of Local Government for its continued collaboration and commitment towards promoting transparency, accountability, and efficiency in the delivery of public infrastructure projects. This report signifies an important milestone in the partnership between CoST Uganda and MoLG, as it independently reviews the disclosure and implementation practices of selected infrastructure projects under the Ministry's portfolio. This review reflects the shared objective to improve public infrastructure governance and foster value for money in project delivery.

The infrastructure sector, particularly under the purview of MoLG in Uganda, continues to grapple with numerous critical issues that undermine project performance and socio-economic impact. According to the Office of the Auditor General⁴, key challenges include procurement delays, limited information disclosure, cost overruns, weak health and safety compliance on worksites and a lack of focus on infrastructure maintenance and asset management. This threatens long-term sustainability and a return on investment of public assets.

Within the institutional landscape, MoLG operates under a framework of established accountability mechanisms guided by national laws that include the Public Finance Management Act 2015⁵, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDA) Act 2003, amended 2021⁶ and the Local Government Financial and Accounting Regulations⁷. These frameworks provide requirements for financial, procurement and project reporting standards to promote integrity in public infrastructure delivery. However, according to PPDA, gaps remain in data disclosure practices, and reactive accountability mechanisms because accountability often relies on ex-post audits rather than proactive monitoring and the consistent application of safeguards for cost control and community engagement.

The Independent Review aims to highlight these operational gaps while providing actionable recommendations to strengthen project transparency, disclosure standards and accountability frameworks. The results of the review on MATIP-II, PRELNOR, RUDSEC and LEGS, the report will support MoLG and its stakeholders in improving infrastructure governance, aligning with national regulations and adopting international best practices. Additionally, by systematically identifying institutional and capacity issues and aligning its recommendations with national legislation and global best practices, the Independent Review Report positions itself as both a diagnostic and prescriptive tool.

3.0 The Independent Review process and methodology

The CoST Independent Review process aims to turn disclosed infrastructure data into compelling information to strengthen accountability without duplicating existing mechanisms. It achieves this by generating evidence-based insights that help stakeholders identify and address concerns through the project lifecycle (planning, procurement, and implementation).

⁴ Annual Report of the Auditor General to Parliament for the Audit Year ended 31st December 2024

⁵ Regular Fiscal Performance Reporting to Parliament (Section 18)

⁶ Application to all public funds including local governments (Section 2)

⁷ Technical Assistance report – IMF Country Report no. 17/267 September 2017

The scope of the review is informed by available data and sources. It follows the CoST international assurance manual and terms of reference, which are customized to Uganda's context. The objectives are to assess the validity, completeness, and accuracy of disclosed data, analyze it to detect potential issues and highlight concerns with actionable recommendations for improvement in the sector, policy, and project levels for government, the private sector, and civil society

The process for this Independent Review exercise draws insights from the CoST methodology which utilizes the CoST Infrastructure Data Standard (IDS). The process begins with securing formal clearance with Procuring Entities to conduct the Independent Review exercise. The assurance team is then commissioned to undertake the review exercise in line with the manual. A set of data is reviewed by the assurance team, who further undertake in-depth reviews on a sample of projects, as well as site visits to further understand the processes in project delivery and identify areas of concern and good practices. The results of the review are discussed with the respective procuring entities, and the report is published at a public event as a form of facilitating stakeholder discussions on the results.




Figure 1: The Independent Review process

The Independent Review in Uganda focused on projects under MoLG, selected with a sector-level approach to address key concerns in the Local Government infrastructure sector. An in-depth review was conducted on all MoLG projects, identifying a sample of projects recommended for further analysis.

3.1 Projects selected for the Independent Review.

The Independent Review focused on four infrastructure programmes implemented under the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), namely: MATIP-II⁸, PRELNOR⁹, RUDSEC,¹⁰ and LEGS¹¹. These projects were selected based on their ability to offer a wide lens on infrastructure management at the local government level. These programmes offered their strategic contribution to Market Infrastructure, agricultural market linkages, rural access roads, and value chain support at the local government level in alignment with Uganda's National

⁸ Markets and Agricultural Trade Improvement Programme Phase II

⁹ Project for Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region

¹⁰ Rural Development and Food Security Project in Northern Uganda

¹¹ Local Economic Growth Support Project

Development Plan III (NDP III). Only projects where MoLG was the major implementing agency were assessed, leaving projects like NOSP¹² and USMID¹³.

A detailed description of these programmes, including their scope, budget, duration, and funding sources, is provided in Annex 1: Overview of infrastructure programmes assessed. A comprehensive list of projects selected under the four programmes identified is provided under Annex 2: Summary of infrastructure projects reviewed.

The Table presented in Annex 2 provides a detailed summary of the infrastructure projects reviewed, including project names, descriptions (construction or rehabilitation of community access roads and markets), and specific lengths where applicable. Additionally, the annex highlights the geographical spread of the projects across the country.

¹² Under Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF)

¹³ Under Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development (MoLHUD)

Project locations




Figure 2: Location of programmes

4.0 Results from the desk review

4.1 Sources of data

Effective publication of infrastructure data is a fundamental aspect of promoting transparency, accountability and citizen engagement in governance. In Uganda, various platforms are managed by government ministries, development partners, and procurement agencies to serve as channels for disseminating such data.

Table 1 below presents findings from an assessment of selected disclosure platforms regarding the availability and accessibility of information on infrastructure projects according to the CoST IDS, implemented under the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG). The review covers both government-managed and development partner platforms, evaluating their performance in disclosing project-related data. Additionally, comments have been provided to highlight gaps, commend good practices, and offer recommendations for improving proactive disclosure efforts in line with national transparency and accountability frameworks.

Table 1: Sources of Data

Disclosure Platforms	Findings	Comments
MoLG website	- The MoLG website was under maintenance for the duration of the proactive study and no information was available for disclosure for all the projects assessed.	- Public access to Infrastructure data is crucial; downtime due to maintenance should be minimal in accordance with the guidelines for the development and management of government websites developed by NITA-U ¹⁴ .
Development Partners. AfDB - MATIP KfW - RUDSEC IsDB (LLF) - LEGS IFAD – PRELNOR	- Data availability varied across donor websites for MATIP-2, RUDSEC, and LEGS projects. AfDB had the most data, while KfW DB and IsDB had the least.	- The MoLG is encouraged to benchmark from websites like the AfDB and IFAD for developing a structured and comprehensive website that follows national information publication requirements.
Others	- MoFPED's website provided information on the PRELNOR, RUDSEC, and LEGS projects, with limited information on MATIP-2 Markets.	- MoFPED's integrated bank of projects portal provides valuable information for data disclosure. Additionally, MoLG is encouraged to use this website for benchmarking.
Government Procurement Portal (GPP)	- Limited data was retrieved from the GPP and eGP regarding infrastructure projects under MoLG.	- MoLG is encouraged to update its project data through the GPP to maintain an up-to-date record of accessible public infrastructure data.

¹⁴ Guidelines for Development and Management of Government Websites, June 2014 -NITA-U

eGP (GoU E-Procurement Portal)	- The eGP provided no information regarding infrastructure projects under MoLG.	MoLG should enforce the mandatory use of the eGP platform for all infrastructure and service procurement processes across district local governments and affiliated projects
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4.2 Proactive disclosure

The proactively disclosed data was assessed against the CoST Infrastructure Data Standard to evaluate the level of transparency in infrastructure projects implemented under MoLG. Proactive disclosure focused on the 4 major programmes (MATIP-II, PRELNOR, RUSEC, and LEGS) highlighted above. A total of 40 data points, organized under project (Identification, Preparation, and Completion) and contract stages (Tender Management and Completion), were systematically reviewed to measure the extent of proactive disclosure. The IDS is presented in Annex 3: IDS for proactive disclosure.

Results from the proactive disclosure of the 4 Programmes are presented below.




Figure 3: Overall proactive disclosure for Infrastructure projects under MoLG

The bar chart in figure 3 illustrates the levels of proactive disclosure of infrastructure data by MoLG across the four assessed programmes.

Overall, the proactive disclosure rate across all programmes stands at 58%, reflecting a moderate level of transparency. While this presents a notable effort towards openness. It still falls short of the ideal threshold recommended in this report, which emphasizes consistent and comprehensive proactive disclosure as a key accountability measure for public infrastructure programmes.

Project-specific findings indicate the following:

MATIP-II scored the highest proactive disclosure rate at 88%. This good performance may be attributed to the involvement of development partners such as AfDB which mandate higher standards of public accountability. PRELNOR followed with a disclosure rate of 68%, moderately above the overall average, but with room for improvement.

In contrast, RUDSEC (40%) and LEGS (35%) displayed the weakest disclosure performance, which aligns with the observation that smaller or domestically funded projects tend to lag in transparency practices, often due to weak institutional frameworks and limited capacity for data management and publication.

While the data highlights commendable practices in selecting programmes like MATIP-II. It also exposes persistent gaps in others, underscoring the need for MoLG to prioritize proactive disclosure reforms.

4.3 Proactive disclosure under the project and contract stages

The overall proactive disclosure rates for project and contract data across different stages of the infrastructure lifecycle are represented in Annex 4: Overall proactive disclosure under project and contract stages

The analysis reveals a significant variance in disclosure performance:

Project identification recorded the highest proactive disclosure rate at 93%, indicating that most of the project details under this category, such as names, owners, locations, and purpose, are consistently made available to the public. This reflects a strong commitment to transparency at the early stages of project formulation, likely driven by the requirements for approvals and stakeholder consultations.

Project preparation (68%) and project completion (67%) also demonstrated relatively high disclosure although below identification. This suggests that while data such as ESIs, funding sources, project scope, and projected completion outcomes are generally accessible, there are still gaps in consistently updating and publishing this information.

In contrast, **tender Management (41%) and implementation (33%)** stages showed notably lower levels of proactive disclosure. This indicates weak publication of critical contract-related information, including procurement processes, contract values, variations, and implementation progress. These stages, often associated with significant financial transactions and potential risks for mismanagement, remain unpublished and therefore under-assessed.

The low disclosure rates during tender management and implementation limit the participation of the private sector in procurement and affect public oversight and accountability in areas most susceptible to inefficiencies and corruption risks.

By effectively institutionalizing mandatory data submission protocols, enhancing the capacity of project managers to report real-time progress and leveraging existing e-procurement and project monitoring platforms for regular public updates, MoLG can significantly improve transparency and rebuild public trust in infrastructure delivery.

4.4 Summary of factors affecting project implementation

The assessment of infrastructure projects under MoLG revealed several recurring factors affecting project implementation across MATIP-II, PRELNOR, RUDSEC, and LEGS projects. These challenges reflect both project-specific issues and deeper sector-wide structural weaknesses illustrated below:

Delays in the procurement of consultants and contractors to undertake design reviews, supervision, and construction works registered on RUDSEC and MATIP-II projects ¹⁵

¹⁵ Project Implementation Report for Public Sector Operations- AfDB

compromise start-up times, disrupt project schedules, and contribute to a reactive culture rather than proactive project management within the broader infrastructure sector.

MoFPED report on externally funded projects highlighted that PRELNOR projects, particularly the construction and completion of the Aswa Bridge, were delayed by financial and procurement challenges¹⁶, as well as insufficient funding for some other road projects. Weak financial management systems undermine the sector's ability to deliver infrastructure efficiently, increasing the risk of cost overruns.




Figure 3: Factors Affecting Project Implementation

Some of the LEGS projects saw slow progress, particularly in the construction civil works of the Kanapa water system and the Ocorimongin rice plant attributed to contractors' weak financial capacity¹⁷. Additionally, RUDSEC projects were hampered by inconsistent and delayed disbursement of funds coupled with delays in procuring design and ESIA consultants¹⁸. Insufficient capacity among implementing firms affects the quality, timeliness and sustainability of infrastructure projects and points to the need for stronger contractor management and skills development initiatives across the sector.

4.5 Sources of funding

The source of funding is an important indicator of *long-term fiscal sustainability*. Where loans are used to finance projects, loan repayments extend into the future and have an impact on the financial viability (whether the project benefits outweigh the long-term costs). The reviewed projects reported a 61.5% reliance on loans, with individual programmes like MATIP-II (90%) and LEGS (85%) almost entirely loan-financed. This signals a high debt exposure to infrastructure financing, posing long-term sustainability concerns. Heavy reliance on loans limits the government's financial flexibility and increases debt servicing obligations, making future infrastructure programmes vulnerable to external economic conditions and lender policies.

Regarding financial viability, MATIP-2 disclosed financial data¹⁹ that demonstrated financial viability, including details on cash flows, loan utilization, and repayment capacity within its implementation framework. In contrast, PRELNOR and LEGS projects did not disclose specific financial viability assessments within their reporting frameworks. However, both projects were financed under highly concessional terms with provisions for low interest rates, extended grace

¹⁶ MoFPED Performance of externally funded projects Report. Sept 2024. pg.274

¹⁷ MoFPED Performance of externally funded projects Report. Sept 2024. pg.282

¹⁸ MoFPED Performance of externally funded projects Report. Sept 2024. pg.290

¹⁹ Appraisal Report: Markets and Agricultural Trade Improvement Programme – 12/12/2014 AfDB

periods, and long-term repayment schedules. These terms were reported as a mechanism to support affordability and long-term debt sustainability.




Figure 4: Source of Funding

According to figure 5, grants accounted for 25.3% of overall funding and were heavily concentrated on RUDSEC, while being minimal or absent from other programmes. This uneven distribution highlights inconsistent negotiation outcomes with development partners and suggests financial imbalance, with some projects enjoying favourable terms while others rely on costly loans.

Only 11.5% of overall funding came from GoU indicating limited prioritization of infrastructure financing within national resources, potentially affecting ownership and the sector's ability to respond independently to emerging needs.

The near absence of community or beneficiary contribution (1-2%) co-financing indicates weak local engagement in infrastructure investments. This can affect project sustainability, operation, and maintenance post-completion, as communities may not feel invested in infrastructure assets, they did not help finance.

Key Takeaways

Insights

- The overall proactive disclosure rate across all programmes stood at 58%, reflecting a moderate level of transparency.
- Delays were attributed to the delayed procurement of suppliers (RUDSEC and MATIP-II) and weak financial management systems.
- There was a heavy reliance on external loans, represented at 61.5% with MATIP-II (90%) and LEGS (85%), almost entirely loan-financed.
- While some projects showcased good practices in tender management, time and cost overruns, others faced challenges

	in procurement, financial management and stakeholder engagement. - Absence of community or beneficiary contribution (1-2%) co-financing.
Gaps	- Weak disclosure and transparency systems. - Delays in project implementation. - Heavy Reliance on External Funding within the sector.
Recommendations	- MoLG should operationalize and maintain updated project disclosure systems on platforms like eGP and GPP. - MoLG and DLGs should strengthen procurement planning capacities to remove bottlenecks - MoLG should advocate for increased budget allocation to Local Government Infrastructure development

5.0 Selection of projects for in-depth review

As part of the independent review process, a proactive study was conducted to map and profile ongoing and completed projects implemented under various government programmes. Through this study, four major programmes were identified, comprising a total of 62 projects spread across different regions of the country, highlighted in Annex 2.

To ensure a fair and representative assessment of project performance, random sampling was applied to the 62 identified projects. This approach was used to enhance objectivity in project selection and to reduce potential bias in the review process. From this exercise, 10 projects were selected as case studies on the road infrastructure sector under MoLG. These projects highlighted in Table 3 below were spread across five District Local Governments providing a balanced geographic and operational representation for the in-depth review.

The selection criteria prioritised road infrastructure projects with an interest to further understand the performance of the road sector within the Local Government dynamics. Informed by findings from the desk reviews, road projects faced challenges like delays, cost overruns, and quality issues making the review necessary to further understand the underlying causes and solutions to these problems. The road sector's social and economic contribution and as the bridge to other service sectors informed the decision to focus. The selected projects were then subjected to detailed document reviews, physical inspections, and stakeholder interviews as part of the independent review process aimed at assessing compliance, value for money, and service delivery outcomes.

List of projects selected for in-depth review

Table 2: Selected Infrastructure Projects and Districts

10 SELECTED INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS AND 5 DISTRICTS			
PROJECT	COMMUNITY ACCESS ROADS	LENGTH	LOCATION
PRELNOR	Construction/Rehabilitation of Acalo Wayi - Lodwar - Pacudu	10km	Kitgum
PRELNOR	Construction/Rehabilitation of Labora-Vietnam-Pawidi-Lagam Pii	11.7km	Kitgum
PRELNOR	Construction/Rehabilitation of Lakwor Central - Aloto - Latanya Rd	12km	Kitgum
PRELNOR	Construction/Rehabilitation of Katop Lak-Kumele Wi Cere - Omiya Pachwa	5km	Kitgum
PRELNOR	Construction/Rehabilitation of Good Dero Wii Lacor Rd	5.2km	Nwoya
PRELNOR	Construction/Rehabilitation of Lalem Obomonpe - Oruka Rd	4.1km	Nwoya
PRELNOR	Construction/Rehabilitation of Wii Anaka Central - Layelle Rd	14km	Nwoya
LEGS	Rehabilitation of the Rwebisengo-Kiranga community access road	7km	Ntoroko
LEGS	Rehabilitation of Kyayi - Kyabagamba road	30.3km	Gomba
LEGS	Rehabilitation of Harugongo-Kakundwa-Busoro Road	7.4km	Kabarole

5.1 Reactive disclosure

For the In-depth review of the 10 selected road infrastructure projects, a set of reactive data points was applied to assess the availability of disclosed information across the project lifecycle. These data points are summarized in Annex 5 IDS for reactive disclosure, which covers both project-level and contract-level data across key stages of Project identification, Project Preparation, Tender management, implementation, and project completion.




Figure 5: Overall level of Reactive Disclosure

Figure 6 shows the overall reactive disclosure levels of the 10 selected road infrastructure projects under MoLG and reveals important insights into transparency and information

management within the sector. The findings point to broader sectoral concerns with evidence that highlights the need for systematic reforms in the overall management of public infrastructure projects.

Inconsistencies in Information disclosure. The disclosure levels varied widely with Goo Dero-Wii Lacor Road (48%) in Nwoya performing least and Labora-Vietnam-Pawidi- Lagam Pii road (70%) scoring the highest. This reflects uneven transparency practices and information management capacity among local governments and project teams which undermine effective oversight and public participation in infrastructure delivery.

Weak Record - Keeping and Documentation. Projects with lower disclosure rates suffered from poor record-keeping and incomplete documentation at both project and contract levels as seen in Ntoroko (56%) and Nwoya (48%-67%) District. Without comprehensive, accessible records, it becomes difficult to track project decisions and financial flows increasing the risk of procurement irregularities.

Need for systematic sectoral reforms. The overall average of non-disclosure (40%) suggests sector-wide challenges in integrating robust disclosure information management systems which calls for MoLG to strengthen its infrastructure project monitoring systems and digital public disclosure mechanisms to ensure all local governments meet a consistent standard.

The weaknesses identified in this section contribute to broader sectoral challenges like procurement inefficiencies, project delivery delays, and diminished public accountability. Addressing these issues requires systematic reforms that include improved record management, training for district technical staff, and enhancing the use of standardized digital infrastructure monitoring platforms.

5.2 Reactive disclosure per project phase

The analysis of the data disclosed by the entity presented in Annex 6 Reactive disclosure per project phase, reveals commendably high disclosure during tender management (99%), Project Identification (95%) and implementation (88%) and drastically falls during project preparation (57%) and lowest at project completion (22%). These patterns point to the following:

Process-driven, not outcome-driven oversight. The sector appears to prioritize procurement and implementation processes that scored highly over monitoring final outputs and impacts. This reactive approach limits opportunities for learning, continuous improvement, and corrective action based on project outcomes.

Weak accountability at closure. The very low disclosure at the completion stage (22%) undermines public oversight of how projects conclude. It becomes unclear whether contractual obligations are fulfilled, funds are properly utilized, or intended benefits are delivered. These unanswered questions leave space for inefficiencies or malpractice to go unchecked.

Vulnerability to cost and time overruns. Poor disclosure in the preparation phase could mean critical documents like Environmental Impact Assessments (ESIAs), financial agreements, and approval decisions are not readily accessible, which increases the risk of incomplete planning, delays, weak citizen engagement and budget escalations during implementation.

The findings from this analysis highlight the need for MoLG to strengthen information management and disclosure mechanisms, particularly during the project preparation and completion stages. By instituting structured monitoring and reporting protocols and mandatory public disclosure across all stages of project delivery, MoLG can ultimately improve returns on infrastructure investments.

5.3. Summary of tender management




Figure 6: Number of firms participating in the tendering process

Figure 7 shows the number of firms participating in the tendering process for selected road infrastructure projects across different districts. Participation levels vary significantly, ranging from 18 firms for the Kyai-Kyabagamba road in Gomba to 6 firms for the Rwebisengo-Kiranga road in Ntoroko, with evident bidder imbalance in bidder interest across projects. Despite the numbers being within the required proportion legally, increased bidder participation in infrastructure procurement improves competition and levels the playing field for businesses in bidding at fair prices, thereby reducing the cost of doing business for the government.

The results from this review represent important procurement challenges across the sector, illustrated below:

Uneven Market participation across Districts. The higher number of bidders in some districts like Gomba on the Kyai-Kyabagamba road, suggests better supplier engagement with the procurement process, while low participation in others, like Kitgum, reflects lower engagement with the tendering process.

Possible barriers to market entry. The lower participation numbers in Ntoroko (6 firms) and Kitgum (7 firms for some roads) indicated barriers to contractor participation. A detailed study of the possible barriers would help provide further insight into the challenges affecting contractor interest and entry into these regions.

The disparities in tender participation rates reflect broader procurement system inefficiencies under MoLG that include challenges in market engagement. Addressing these issues would require enhancing procurement transparency, lowering barriers for contractors, and actively engaging the market to increase competition and improve infrastructure project outcomes.

5.4 Summary of quality management, environmental & social protection, and health & safety.

The data disclosed across all three thematic areas scored an average of 56% compliance relative to good practice benchmarks (national and international standards). Additionally, the analysis revealed weaknesses concentrated in contract documents, with moderate performance in instructions to bidders (67%) and site supervision (67%). The detailed Assessment is shown in Annex 7: Assessment of processes. The findings revealed the following sectoral concerns:

Weak contractual enforcement mechanisms. Contracts under the LEGS and PRELNOR programmes often lacked detailed binding provisions for Quality, E&S, and Health & Safety management conforming to national and international standards. This was not found in the contract agreements for the two programmes. These gaps diminish effective contract management.

For example, LEGS and PRELNOR road contracts typically required contractors to adhere to Ministry of Works technical specifications and Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) but lacked explicit provisions requiring them to submit Quality Assurance plans conforming to UNBS codes or internationally recognised standards like ISO 9001:2015. Quality management was often handled through general supervision by district engineers as opposed to a documented, contractor-led system.

Limited supervisory capacity. It was also noted that the district engineers and project management teams lacked the technical capacity and tools for effective compliance supervision. This was due to the general absence of structured monitoring frameworks for Quality Assurance, E&S and Health & Safety.

For example, in Gomba, Kyai-Kabagambe road showed progress report photos with workers without site helmets and protective reflective clothing and in Nwoya, Lalem-Obomonpe-Oruka road also displayed workers in sandals working without boots, and helmets during excavation works.

Table 3: Assessment of processes

Process	Quality Management	Environmental & Social Protection	Health & Safety
Instruction to Bidders	Material specification and Workmanship require reference to Uganda's National Bureau of Standards and the Ministry of Works Road standards	Requires compliance with the National Environment Act 2019 and regulations under NEMA (National Environment Management Authority)	Requires contractors to adhere to the National Occupational Health and Safety Act 2006.

Contract documents	Contract documents do not explicitly include a detailed Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) conforming to UNBS codes or ISO 9001	Contract documents do not systematically include the requirement for an Environmental and Social Protection plan that complies with national standards	Contract documents do not explicitly include a site-specific Health and Safety Management Plan, but they do document occupational safety obligations in broad terms.
Site visit	While there seem to be quality control procedures in place for material testing, there was evidence of limited proactive defect correction mechanisms on several roads.	While the community provided most of the land for the road corridor, there was evidence of uncontrolled community encroachment and practices (e.g. removing gabion stones in Kitgum for the PRELNOR programme)	While the majority of projects maintained signboards post-construction, several others lacked appropriate traffic control and signage during construction.

5.5 Summary of cost, time overruns, and stakeholder engagements

The Markets and Agricultural Trade Improvement Programme (MATIP-II) demonstrated commendable procurement practices, adhering to national guidelines and conducting transparent international competitive bidding. The project's ability to realize cost savings and finance additional work showcases effective procurement management. However, other projects like RUDSEC and PRELNOR exhibited limited procurement transparency, underscoring the need **for standardized, proactive disclosure and accountability measures across related initiatives**.

While most projects avoided substantial time overruns, critical delays were noted in the RUDSEC programme due to **procurement bottlenecks and delayed financing disbursements**, threatening timely project delivery and potentially inflating costs. Additionally, specific road projects under the LEGS programme, such as the Harugongo-Kakundwa road (2.5 years) and Kyai-Kyabagamba road (1.5 years) suffered the longest delays, exposing **weaknesses in project planning, supervision, and contract performance management**, illustrated in figure 8 below.




Figure 7: Time overruns for selected road projects under MoLG

According to figure 8, cost overruns were also evident with some of the LEGS projects, for example, Kyai-Kyabagambe road in Gomba registering 86% beyond the original contract sum, **largely attributed to inadequate contract design reviews** and flawed **Bill of Quantities (BoQ) preparation**. Common issues included missing design details like gravel layer specifications and drainage dimensions, leading to costly contract variations. These overruns signal systematic inefficiencies in feasibility studies, design approvals and construction oversight within the sector.

Financial management performance varied across projects, with MATIP-II remaining within budget and even achieving project savings while PRELNOR exceeded its budget allocations and LEGS struggled with low fund absorption. These discrepancies point to **weaknesses in financial oversight and budget execution capacity in some programmes**, emphasizing the need for strengthened fiscal discipline and monitoring frameworks in MoLG infrastructure delivery.

Following stakeholder engagements carried out on the two road infrastructure projects under LEGS (Kyai-Kyabagambe road in Gomba) and PRELNOR (Goo Dero Wii Lacor Road in Nwoya District), a recurring issue of **limited involvement of local communities in planning and implementation of road works emerged**, with the community members in Nwoya noting that while the road network extended coverage within the district, access to critical services like healthcare was limited.

To address this gap, one family offered land during the community meeting to facilitate the construction of a **Health Centre II at Mulila village**. There were also scope changes for the **Wii Lacor Road from 5.2km to 7.9km** resulting from failure to secure the right of way from one family that demanded compensation which was not provided for in the project budget. In Gomba, community members highlighted the lack of information about project details including budget and timelines that led to questions about the intended project benefits. In addition,

some suppliers of construction materials and hotel providers complained of a lack of payment by the contractor.

Additionally, community members on both projects highlighted issues related to the **centralisation of procurement planning and records management** highlighting that in Nwoya, procurement for the Goo Dero Wii Lacor road was conducted in Kampala at the MoLG headquarters with most of the documentation retained there. This arrangement not only weakens district-level oversight but also compromises transparency and accountability in project execution.

A detailed list of the findings from the community engagements has been provided in Annex 9: Community baraza meetings.

The assessment of infrastructure projects under MATIP-II, RUDSEC, PRELNOR, and LEGS underscores the need for a more consistent and accountable approach to procurement, financial management and community engagement across the Ministry of Local Government's infrastructure portfolio. While MATIP-II sets a strong example of transparent procurement and effective budget utilization, challenges observed in RUDSEC, PRELNOR, and LEGS which include delays, cost overruns, and limited stakeholder involvement, reveal systematic gaps in planning, supervision, and operational efficiency. Addressing these structural and procedural deficiencies will require MoLG to strengthen project design standards, decentralize oversight functions, and institutionalize inclusive mechanisms to ensure that infrastructure investments are both efficient and responsive to community needs.

6.0 Summary of site visits

From the site visits, it was observed that while most roads constructed under LEGS and PRELNOR were operational and had project signboards post-construction, there was no clear framework for the management, maintenance, or record-keeping of completed road assets at the districts. Roads would quickly deteriorate due to the:

- Lack of routine maintenance schedules.
- Inadequate funding, technical upkeep and
- The absence of an updated centralized asset inventory or registry.

A detailed list of all the road projects assessed, along with pictures is attached in Annex 8 Site Visit Findings.

Key takeaways

Insights	- While reactive disclosure was registered at 60%, disclosed data suggested overall sector-wide challenges related to inadequate information management systems. - Record keeping and documentation challenges were disclosed partly due to inadequate frameworks for project monitoring and implementation. - Data disclosed revealed limited involvement of local communities in the planning and implementation of road works.
Gaps	- Insufficient Institutional and Technical capacity. - Weak asset management and maintenance culture. - Weak contractual enforcement Mechanisms.

Recommendations

- MoLG should investigate the establishment of Asset Management Units responsible for inventory and maintenance scheduling to ensure effective upkeep throughout their lifecycle.
- MoLG can launch national capacity-building programmes for LG engineers.
- MoLG can empower supervising consultants and LG engineers to strictly enforce defect liability periods, variation approval procedures, and liquidated damages for delays.

7.0 Recommendations for the Independent Review

The findings from the Independent Review revealed persistent institutional, capacity and operational challenges that undermine the efficiency, sustainability, and value-for-money outcomes of infrastructure investments. The recommendations from the findings include the following:

Institutional Framework Concerns

1. Weak disclosure and transparency systems.

- Overall proactive disclosure for infrastructure projects assessed under MoLG stood at 58%, with MATIP-II performing best at 88%, PRELNOR 68%, RUDSEC 40% and LEGS lowest at 35%. (Refer to IDS)
- The MoLG website was under maintenance during the three months of the proactive disclosure review restricting access to vital contract and project data which undermines the government's efforts to encourage the use of ICT to promote transparency, accountability and improved engagement with citizens.
- For the PRELNOR programme, the review identified that the departure of the externally recruited project team at closure, coupled with the project's Gulu-based office's lack of contact traceability, left critical documents inaccessible and unavailable.

Recommendation

- MoLG is encouraged to improve its internal information management systems and utilize the government's digital disclosure platforms such as the eGP and GPP to archive and disclose data on infrastructure projects to enhance transparency and accountability.
- MoLG should establish a dedicated contingency framework to ensure uninterrupted access to essential contract and project data during periods of website maintenance or systems downtime through hosting critical documents on a mirrored platform and integrating a temporary public access portal.
- To institutionalize knowledge transfer and handover protocols, MoLG can set up a central MoLG repository that is both physical and digital for archiving project reports and operational documents. Additionally, MoLG can establish end-of-project workshops where technical staff are briefed on project outcomes, challenges and recommendations.

2. Persistent cost overruns

- The data revealed a recurring challenge of cost overruns in local government infrastructure projects, particularly under the LEGS programme. A notable example is

the Kyai-Kyabagamba road in Gomba district, which registered cost overruns of 86% beyond the original contract sum attributed inadequate contract design reviews and flawed BoQ preparation.

Recommendation

- MoLG should strengthen its contract management framework by institutionalizing mandatory, multi-level technical reviews of contract designs and Bills of Quantities (BoQ) prior to tendering. All infrastructure designs should be made comprehensive, incorporating detailed site assessments, technical specifications and accurate quantity take-offs to minimize scope ambiguities and unforeseen variations during implementation.
3. **Weak asset management and maintenance culture.**
- While Uganda has established asset management policies such as the Government of Uganda Asset Accounting Policies and Guidelines (AAPG)²⁰ and the Public Financial Management Act 2015, findings from the LEGS and PRELNOR projects revealed gaps in local-level implementation. Some of these included outdated asset registers and insufficient funding for maintenance activities, leading to reduced service life.

Recommendation

- MoLG should consider establishing or strengthening asset management units responsible for inventory, maintenance scheduling, and asset condition monitoring to ensure efficient and effective management throughout their lifecycle.
- MoLG is encouraged to require all Local Governments implementing infrastructure projects to include life-cycle costing, operation, and maintenance plans as part of feasibility studies to shift focus from short-term to long-term value for money.

Capacity Issues

4. Insufficient institutional and technical capacity

- Accessed data revealed persistent weaknesses in post-construction handover processes, with local governments lacking the necessary technical, financial and logistical capacity to effectively assume responsibility for supervising, maintaining and managing infrastructure assets, thereby compromising their ability to serve their intended lifespan.
- The review established that MoLG faces insufficient institutional capacity to effectively manage infrastructure projects after construction is complete, characterized by inadequate asset management systems and limited technical supervision capabilities which collectively undermine sustainability and functionality of completed investments.
- The review revealed that MoLG lacks adequate technical capacity to manage infrastructure projects post-construction, evidenced by limited personnel for asset supervision, absence of dedicated infrastructure maintenance units and weak systems for routine inspection and performance monitoring which hinders the preservation and optimal functionality of completed assets.
- Limited and delayed involvement of local communities contributed to project scope changes and community dissatisfaction. For example, in Nwoya, the 5.2km Wii Lacor was diverted and extended to 7.9km after the project failed to secure the right of way through private land, as compensation provisions were not in place. Similarly, in

²⁰ MoFPED GoU Asset Accounting Policies and Guidelines. April 2023

Gomba, community members expressed concerns about the project's relevance and benefits due to inadequate information on project timelines, budgets and objectives.

Recommendation

- MoLG should establish a dedicated Infrastructure Asset Management Unit responsible for over-seeing post-construction supervision, maintenance planning and asset performance tracking.
- MoLG, in partnership with professional sector bodies and entities, is encouraged to launch national capacity-building programmes for LG engineers on construction contract administration, environmental and social safeguards, quality management systems, and infrastructure asset management. Additionally, MoLG-MoWT technical workshops could be held to facilitate peer learning.
- To foster effective citizen engagement in infrastructure projects, MoLG is encouraged to implement a multi-faceted approach that involves early and continuous communication, transparency, and collaborative decision-making with citizens. This includes ensuring timely and accessible information, providing diverse avenues for engagement, and actively seeking feedback throughout the project lifecycle.

5. Weak contractual enforcement mechanisms.

- Accessed data revealed that contract agreements under PRELNOR and LEGS lacked comprehensive and detailed binding provisions on quality assurance, environmental & social safeguards and health and safety management conforming to UNBS codes, ISO 9001:2015 and other national standards.

Recommendation

- MoLG should urgently revise its standard contract templates for infrastructure projects to include comprehensive and binding provisions for Quality Assurance, Environmental & Social Safeguards and Health & Safety management to clearly define contractor obligations, reporting requirements and compliance measures.

6. Delayed programme implementation

- PRELNOR and LEGS registered delays of up to 13% and 135%²¹ of the original duration respectively, citing procurement delays and financial challenges while MATIP-II and RUDSEC registered no delays/impact to original duration.
- MATIP-2 cited delays associated with the procurement of consultants and contractors to undertake the work of rebuilding 12 markets²²

Recommendation

- Through partnerships with entities like PPDA and MoFPED, MoLG is encouraged to strengthen its procurement planning capacity through regular procurement training of staff, resource allocation, and enhancing collaboration between departments to remove bottlenecks.

²¹ Performance of externally funded projects – MoFPED Pg. 273 & Pg. 280

²² Project Completion rRport for Public Sector Operations 04.10.2024 – AfDB Pg. 4

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[Annex 1: Overview of infrastructure programmes](#)

[Annex 2: Summary of infrastructure projects](#)

[Annex 3: IDS for proactive disclosure](#)

[Annex 4: Overall proactive disclosure under project and contract stages](#)

[Annex 5: IDS for in-depth review](#)

[Annex 6: Disclosure per category \(in-depth review\)](#)

[Annex 7: Assessment of processes](#)

[Annex 8: Site visit findings](#)

[Annex 9: Community baraza meetings](#)